The ISW took a closer look at the Russian mobilization. “Putin’s problems are so deep …”

“Russia will mobilize for this conflict reservists. The process will be ugly, the quality of the reservists low, and their motivation to fight even worse. But the systems exist enough to allow military commissars and other Russian officials to find people and send them to training units and then go to war, ”assesses the TI.

Voluntary Conscription

According to experts, the low quality of units created so far from the “volunteer” conscription and “volunteer battalions” makes it possible to assess what increase in the combat strength Russia can expect from forced mobilization. “Mobilization will not affect the course of the conflict in 2022 and may not have too dramatic effect on Russia’s ability to sustain the effort at its current level in 2023, ‘the report said.

“The problems undermining Putin’s effort to mobilize society are finally so deep and fundamental that he cannot fix them in the coming months, and perhaps for years. Putin is probably facing tough restrictions Russia’s ability to wage a large-scale war, ”assesses the TI.

Analysts point out that the Russian armed forces have not created the conditions for effective large-scale mobilization since at least 2008, and have not built a reserve force needed for sudden recruitment and immediate effect on the battlefield. “There are no quick solutions to these problems,” underlined.

In recent decades, Russia has moved away from the conscript-based model to a mixed model of conscripted and recruited soldiers. contract soldiers. This was accompanied by a reduction in the period of compulsory basic service from two years to one year in 2007-2008, which means that current reservists under the age of 30 have received much less training.

Four attempts at mobilization

In the past year, Putin has made at least four mobilization attempts that exhausted the pool of available, capable and ready-to-fight reservists. The latest “partial mobilization” will therefore apply to Russians who did not want to fight and have not volunteered to join the army, nor have they been forced to do so yet.

The protests and resistance to mobilization, on the other hand, reflect Putin’s failures in preparing Russian society for a major war. Kremlin officials and propagandists ridiculed the possibility of the attack until the very end before the invasion, and even some Russian soldiers seemed surprised when they were sent into battle because they thought they were taking part in the exercise. Authorities continued to describe the war as a “special military operation.”

“Putin’s informational failures in this matter are particularly important, as there are no Ukrainian or NATO soldiers on Russian soil, nor any threat to the center of Russia. This is not 1812, 1914 or 1941. The factors that drove widespread mobilization in Russia’s previous wars are simply absent from this aggressive war by choice, however Putin presents it to the public, ”emphasizes the ISW.

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